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ABSTRACT 
 
Accounting estimates are developed in a bottom-up fashion; subordinates 
generate estimates that are reviewed by managers. The anchoring heuristic suggests 
managers may be highly influenced by subordinates’ initial estimates. However, 
motivated reasoning theory predicts that reporting incentives will bias managers’ review 
in favor of estimates that are incentive consistent, and managers will selectively attend to 
information that supports their preferred conclusion, including their perceptions of the 
subordinate. Using experimental methods I manipulate the consistency of the subordinate 
estimate with management reporting incentives, and the narcissistic description of the 
subordinate. Consistent with motivated reasoning theory, I find that managers anchor on 
incentive consistent subordinate estimates, regardless of subordinate narcissism, but 
anchor less on incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, especially when the estimate 
comes from a narcissistic subordinate. I also find evidence that managers believe 
narcissistic subordinates act strategically in their own self-interest, and selectively attend 
to this belief to adjust away from incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, but not 
incentive consistent subordinate estimate. My results reveal two potential weaknesses in 
the management review process: susceptibility to subordinate anchors, and bias created 
by reporting incentives.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Management review processes are an integral part of a well-functioning internal 
control system (COSO 2013). Recent PCAOB inspection results have led to the release of 
Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 11, which highlights management review processes as an 
area of weakness for auditors and managers (PCAOB 2013). In follow-up comments to 
that practice alert, PCAOB Board Member, Jeanette M. Franzel expressed her view that,  
“We are currently in a ‘perfect storm’ in the area of internal control over 
financial reporting…we’ve seen multiple cycles in which company 
management and internal and external auditors simply didn’t get it right,” 
(Franzel 2014).  
 
While the PCAOB is primarily focused on improving the audit process, Ms. Franzel’s 
comments highlight the importance of management commitment for internal control 
effectiveness. The management review process is designed to detect material 
misstatements, but the effectiveness of the review depends on the integrity, competence, 
and objectivity of the reviewer. 
 While the review process is highly dependent on managers, it is also dependent on 
subordinates. Accounting estimates are generated in a bottom-up fashion. A subordinate 
is responsible for evaluating the pertinent information, and developing an estimate, and 
then the manager reviews the subordinate’s work before approving or adjusting the 
estimate. Prior accounting research has demonstrated that subordinates can influence 
managers’ conclusions in the context of the audit review process (Asare and McDaniel 
1996; Ricchiute 1999; Tan and Jamal 2001; Frank and Hoffman 2015). The general 
finding is that managers tend to rely, or anchor, on the conclusions of their subordinates. 
This anchoring heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) is extremely robust and difficult 
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to overcome (see Furnham and Boo (2011) for a review of the literature), and suggests 
that managers will be significantly influenced by the initial estimate of the subordinate in 
the review process.  
Psychology literature on motivated reasoning suggests that the anchoring effect 
may decrease when it is less consistent with incentives (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Ditto, 
Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, and Lockhart 1998). Motivated reasoning may enable 
managers to strategically justify adjusting away from subordinate estimates that are 
inconsistent with their incentives. Motivated reasoning occurs when an individual has a 
preference in regards to the outcome of a reasoning task, such as evaluating evidence and 
estimating the most likely outcome (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992). This causes 
preference-consistent information to be examined less critically than preference-
inconsistent information. A large literature in accounting demonstrates that managers 
have incentives to misreport (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and Skinner 2000; 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). Incentives to manage earnings should bias 
managers’ evaluation of evidence against supporting an accounting estimate that is 
inconsistent with their incentives, thereby reducing anchoring on incentive-inconsistent 
subordinate conclusions. 
This effect should be stronger when characteristics of the subordinate, such as 
narcissism, make justification easier. Narcissism is of particular interest because research 
has documented that its prevalence has increased over time (Macky, Gardner, Forsyth, 
Twenge, and Campbell 2008; Bergman, Westerman and Daly 2010). This means the 
newest generation entering the workforce is likely to be more narcissistic than its 
predecessors. Narcissism is associated with exploitive behavior, and management 
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research finds that subordinate narcissism is negatively associated with manager 
perceptions of integrity and trustworthiness (Blair, Hoffman, and Helland 2008). It is 
important to understand how narcissism may influence management’s judgment because 
of the increasing prevalence of narcissism in the workforce and its potential to be used by 
management to justify discounting subordinates’ conclusions when such conclusions are 
inconsistent with management’s incentives. I posit that managers will strategically use 
subordinate narcissism to justify diverging from incentive-inconsistent subordinate 
conclusions.  
  I examine managers’ susceptibility to subordinate conclusions and their use of 
motivated reasoning in the context of a management review of an inventory valuation. 
The inherent ambiguity in an inventory valuation allows a range of acceptable estimates, 
making management more susceptible to motivated reasoning. Inventory valuations are 
typically made at the end of the reporting period, when it is easier to assess performance 
relative to a target. A decrease in inventory value requires a write down that reduces 
current period earnings. If financial performance is in danger of falling below 
expectations, managers should have a strong preference for minimizing a write down 
(maximizing the inventory valuation). Further, accounting estimates are discretionary, 
and allow for greater latitude in judgment. Managers are more likely to engage in 
motivated reasoning because there is no clear-cut answer. 
 Using experimental methods I construct a scenario where MBAs are put in the 
role of a division manager responsible for reviewing and approving an estimate for a 
valuation write down of damaged inventory. I manipulate the consistency of the 
subordinate’s estimate with the manager’s incentives; in the incentive-consistent 
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condition the subordinate proposes a small write down (high valuation) that would allow 
the division to meet an earnings target, in the incentive-inconsistent condition the 
subordinate proposes a larger write down (low valuation) that would cause the division to 
miss the earnings target. I also manipulate characteristics of the subordinate that should 
make it easier or harder to justify adjusting away from the subordinate estimate. Holding 
knowledge, ability, and experience constant, I manipulate the personality of the 
subordinate as exhibiting either high or low narcissism.    
I find evidence of a general anchoring effect. Relative to a control group with no 
subordinate estimate, participants provided a larger (smaller) subordinate write down 
make final estimates that are larger (smaller). I also find evidence of motivated reasoning 
in managers’ behavior. Participants anchor less on incentive-inconsistent subordinate 
estimates, and this effect is strongest when the subordinate is described in more 
narcissistic terms. A test of moderated mediation shows that subordinate narcissism 
increases participants’ beliefs that subordinates are strategically reporting to impress 
upper management. However, this belief only reduces management anchoring on 
incentive-inconsistent subordinate estimates.  
My results suggest that subordinates have a significant impact on the reporting 
process and should not be overlooked. However, I also find that reporting incentives 
create a bias in the management review process that is robust enough to overcome 
anchoring effects. Incentives cause managers to engage in motivated reasoning in order 
to justify incentive-consistent reporting choices, even if it means disregarding a 
subordinate’s conclusion. I demonstrate how managers selectively use information about 
a subordinate as an excuse to alter accounting estimates that are inconsistent with their 
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reporting incentives, and conveniently ignore the same information when subordinate 
conclusions are incentive-consistent. This behavior conforms with motivate reasoning 
research showing that people are more critical of preference-inconsistent information, 
and speaks directly to managers’ ability to maintain objectivity in the review process. A 
closer examination of the review process may be warranted to consider ways to mitigate 
motivated reasoning. 
My findings also emphasize the collaborative nature of financial reporting, and 
highlight the importance of interpersonal interactions in accounting decisions. Prior 
reporting literature has focused on manager characteristics (including narcissism), and 
reporting quality (e.g. Murphy 2012; Schrand and Zechman 2012; Ahmed and Duellman 
2013; Jia, Lent, and Zeng 2014; Olsen, Dworkis, and Young 2014). My research suggests 
subordinate employee characteristics should not be overlooked. Subordinate narcissism is 
of particular interest because of the documented generational increase, but corporate 
culture or a more broadly defined culture (e.g. country, region, etc.) could result in 
systemic personality traits within a company. As an example, Enron infamously sought to 
hire Ivy Leaguers who believed they were the most talented, and had strong desires for 
money and success to perpetrate their “win at all costs” mentality (Sims and Brinkmann 
2003).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses the 
development of my hypotheses, Section III explains my methodology and experimental 
design, Section IV reports the results of my experiment, Section V contains additional 
analyses, and Section VI provides a discussion of my results and conclusions of my 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Anchoring 
 
The anchoring heuristic is one of the most robust psychological phenomena. A 
typical anchoring task asks people to provide an estimate for a scenario (a probability, a 
forecast, a valuation, etc.); before the estimates are made, half the participants are 
provided with an anchor value. Studies consistently find the estimates of participants in 
the anchor condition are significantly closer to the anchor than those in the control 
condition. In addition, research has documented anchoring even when participants know 
the anchor contains no informational value (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), when they 
know the anchor provider lacks expertise (Englich and Mussweiler 2001), and when they 
know the anchor provider is biased, or has opposing incentives (Englich, Mussweiler, and 
Strack 2005). While anchoring can be intentional (Epley and Gilovich 2006), anchoring 
often occurs unintentionally. If people are forewarned about anchoring, or incentivized to 
be accurate, researchers still find evidence of anchoring (Wilson, Houston, Etling, and 
Brekke. 1996).  
In prior accounting literature, anchoring has been observed in the behavior of 
auditors. However, auditing tasks add a layer of complexity, relative to a typical 
anchoring task. The goal of the audit is to gather evidence and provide strictly 
independent assurance that the financial statements are presented fairly and in 
compliance with the relevant accounting principles. Auditing standards require auditors 
to maintain professional skepticism in testing clients’ records and reviewing clients’ 
estimates (AU 230). Even though auditors are supposed to be strictly independent 
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evaluators, studies show they are susceptible to anchoring on management provided 
information (McDaniel and Kinney 1995; Earley, Hoffman, and Joe 2008). Research on 
the audit work paper review process likewise finds that reviewers may be over-reliant on 
preparers’ conclusions. This effect can be exacerbated in certain situations, such as when 
the reviewer holds a positive impression of the preparer (Tan and Jamal 2001), or when 
the preparer’s personal biases toward the client are known (Frank and Hoffman 2014).  
These findings are consistent with anchoring effects observed among other 
professionals who are tasked with remaining unbiased. In particular, a series of studies on 
presiding judges demonstrate their sentencing judgments can be influenced by the 
prosecution’s demands, and this behavior is not attenuated by greater experience on the 
bench (Englich and Mussweiler 2001). Similar to auditors, judges have a code of 
conduct, which requires independence and impartiality (General Council 2014). If 
auditors and judges engage in anchoring when it is their explicit job to remain 
independent, then managers are likely to exhibit similar behaviors in the review process 
when their independence and objectivity is under far less scrutiny.  
The prevailing explanation for the anchoring phenomenon is that anchoring is 
caused by confirmatory hypothesis testing (Mussweiler and Strack 1999; Epley and 
Gilovich 2006; Furnham and Boo 2011). That is, the decision maker selectively attends 
to information consistent with the established anchor, resulting in estimates that are 
nearer to the anchor. However, I propose that in the context of a management review, 
reporting incentives may alter this process by causing managers to engage in motivated 
reasoning and adjust away from the anchor, or not engage in anchoring at all.  
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Motivated Reasoning and its Effect on Anchoring 
 
Motivated reasoning causes biased reasoning, including biased information 
access, biased evidence evaluation, and biased judgments that support a preferred 
outcome (Kunda 1990). Information that is consistent with a preferred outcome is 
selectively sought out and is evaluated less critically than information that is inconsistent 
(Ditto and Lopez 1992). Given an anchor, how the anchor is evaluated may depend on 
whether or not the anchor is preferred. If the anchor is preferred, then confirmatory 
hypothesis testing will likely ensue, with predictable anchoring effects produced. 
However, if the anchor is not preferred, then the decision maker may ignore or seek to 
disconfirm the anchor. Instead of searching for evidence to support the anchor, resources 
will be devoted to finding evidence to ignore/reject the anchor. Thus, the key is the 
existence of a preferred alternative target.  
Managers often have strong motivations to intentionally misreport, or manage 
(smooth) earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Dechow and Skinner 2000; Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). The literature documents a variety of settings where 
managers appear to act on these motivations (Jones 1991; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Cheng and Warfield 2005; Seybert 2010; Chen, Kelly, and Salterio 2012). In the context 
of reporting an accounting estimate, reporting incentives create a directional preference 
regarding the estimate, if not a specific target figure. For example, pressure to meet an 
earnings target creates a preference for more aggressive estimates (maximizing revenues 
and minimizing expenses). This may lead managers to engage in motivated reasoning 
(Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992) in order to meet those preferences.  
 9 
 
Motivated reasoning has previously been observed in investor, auditor, and 
manager behavior. Holding a “long” investment position creates investor preferences for 
favorable future outcomes related to the firm. Holding a “short” position creates investor 
preferences for negative future outcomes. Investors’ self-interest biases them to agree 
(disagree) with evidence suggesting they will make (lose) money. Investors have been 
found to subsequently bias their earnings forecasts to be consistent with their preferences, 
even though they know that accurate forecasts are more useful (Hales 2007). Auditors 
sometimes face pressures to agree with a client. Research shows that to mitigate the 
potential loss of a client, auditors will allow the client to report aggressively, and auditors 
justify their decisions by using an aggressive interpretation of the relevant accounting 
standard (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). Corporate managers signal their competence 
by reporting strong financial performance. After establishing an operating strategy, 
managers find it hard to admit mistakes. To the contrary, when evaluating the 
effectiveness of business strategies (i.e. evidence evaluation), managers perceive self-
selected strategies as more successful than strategies they were not involved in selecting 
(Tayler 2010).  
Motivated reasoning is constrained by the availability of a convincing argument 
(Kunda 1990). Accordingly, anchors have their greatest influence when cogent, readily 
available reasons to reject them do not exist. Ambiguity in how to interpret evidence 
increases the likelihood of motivated reasoning (Mayorga, Trotman 2015). Additionally, 
in instances where Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are less specific, 
the potential for preparers of accounting information to engage in motivated reasoning 
increases. This is evident in the language of GAAP, which use terms that are open to 
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interpretation such as “reasonably predictable costs” and “substantial and unusual losses” 
(ASC 330). Similarly, the more disparate the evidence is, the easier it becomes to reason 
one’s way to a preferred conclusion by disproportionately weighting supporting evidence.  
Management Review of Accounting Estimates 
 
 The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of anchoring and motivated 
reasoning within the context of a middle management (e.g., a corporate controller) review 
of a subordinate’s accounting estimate. Reviews are controls designed to prevent 
misstatements; however, reviews of accounting estimates often require a high degree of 
judgment and, as such, the effectiveness of these controls depends on and unbiased 
process. The ambiguous nature of accounting estimates helps facilitate motivated 
reasoning. Accounting estimates are made to accrue for partially completed events. 
Interpretation of incomplete evidence is required. For example, the potential need for an 
inventory write down precipitated by a rare event is a difficult task. As a rare event, it 
lacks precedents to guide judgment; assumptions about the future are required and such 
ambiguity provides significant latitude to accounting managers. In such instances, 
management outcome preferences can be expected to exert high influence. I am 
interested in how features of the subordinate and the initial subordinate estimate influence 
the manager’s review, given the existence of incentives to make an aggressive reporting 
choice. For example, the perceived expertise and credibility of the subordinate would 
appear to be highly germane.   
A management review of an accounting estimate is similar to a senior auditor 
reviewing the work of a junior auditor. In both instances, the purpose of the review is to 
verify the soundness of the conclusion reached by a subordinate. Also, in both instances, 
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the information provided by the subordinate can be assumed to have informational value, 
because the subordinate is presumably qualified to complete the assigned task. To the 
extent that this is true, it may be rational for managers to have a certain degree of 
confidence in subordinate estimates. The anchoring heuristic predicts that managers will 
anchor on the initial estimates proposed by qualified subordinates.  
However, reporting incentives that create directional preferences for the 
accounting estimate may cause managers to engage in motivated reasoning, resulting in 
adjustment away from subordinate estimates that are incentive-inconsistent. If 
incentivized to report aggressively, managers will look for ways to justify doing so. This 
is easily accomplished if the subordinate estimate is incentive-consistent, but more 
difficult if the subordinate estimate is incentive-inconsistent. When provided an 
incentive-inconsistent estimate, if managers are going to disregard it, they need to be able 
to rationalize doing so.  
I examine to what extent managers will consider subordinate personality as 
grounds for justification, specifically subordinate narcissism. Narcissism is increasing in 
younger generations (Macky et al. 2008; Bergman et al. 2010). The youngest generations 
entering the workforce are more likely to be narcissistic than their superiors. Despite 
ample research on executive level narcissism (e.g. Buchholz, Lopatta, and Maas 2014; 
Olsen, Dworkis, and Young 2014; Ham, Lang, Seybert, and Wang 2015) research on the 
implications of the growth in narcissism at the lower levels of the workplace is only just 
emerging. Given the increase in subordinate narcissism, it is important to understand how 
it might affect management’s judgments and decisions. Narcissism is a multifaceted 
construct, but of particular interest is narcissists’ desire to look good and their willingness 
 12 
 
to exploit others (Campbell, Hoffman, Campbell, and Marchisio 2011). Research shows 
that in the workplace, subordinate narcissism is negatively related to manager perceptions 
of interpersonal skills, integrity, and trustworthiness (Blair, Hoffman, and Helland 2008). 
If subordinate narcissism causes managers to question subordinates’ intentions and 
objectivity, it should reduce management anchoring, especially on incentive-inconsistent 
estimates. 
Hypothesis 
 
Reporting incentives create preferences for the reporting of accounting estimates. 
When incentivized to increase earnings, managers will prefer to record a smaller 
inventory write down. I predict that when reviewing subordinate estimates, managers will 
anchor on estimates that are consistent with their incentives (and motivated reasoning), 
resulting in final estimates that significantly reflect the initial subordinate estimate. 
However, I expect anchoring to diminish under conditions where the subordinate’s 
estimate is inconsistent with management’s incentives. 
Subordinate narcissism raises a potential “red flag” against the subordinate 
estimate. If managers interpret subordinate narcissism as affecting subordinate integrity 
and objectivity, this creates grounds for disregarding the subordinate estimate. Motivated 
reasoning suggests managers will use subordinate narcissism as an excuse to adjust away 
from incentive-inconsistent subordinate estimates, but will ignore the effects of 
subordinate narcissism when evaluating incentive-consistent subordinate estimates. I 
predict managers will anchor less on incentive inconsistent subordinate estimates, 
especially when provided by narcissistic subordinates. See Figure 1 for a graphical 
representation of the hypothesis. 
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H1: Managers will anchor less on subordinate estimates that are 
inconsistent with managers’ incentives, especially when managers can 
reason that subordinate estimates are non-reliable due to subordinate 
narcissistic behavior. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Experimental Design and Participants 
 
I test my hypothesis in a 2 x 2 + 1, between subjects design, manipulating the 
consistency of the subordinate estimate with management incentives 
(consistent/inconsistent) and the narcissistic features of the subordinate (low/high). I 
include a control group with no subordinate estimate or subordinate description in order 
to compare managers’ estimates developed with anchors to estimates developed 
independently. Participants assume the role of a mid-level manager responsible for 
reviewing an estimate for an inventory write down.  
Participants were 184 MBA students from a major university in the southwestern 
United States. Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson (2002) recommend matching participants 
to the goals of the study. My study is interested in how mid-level managers make 
reporting decisions. MBAs typically come from similar jobs, or fill these roles upon 
graduating. Participants were recruited via in class announcements and/or e-mail. To 
encourage participation, I offered compensation of $10.
1
 The experiment was completed 
online via Qualtrics, which randomly assigned participants to one of the five 
experimental conditions. The average participant was approximately 32 years old and had 
completed three courses in accounting and finance. Participants came from full time, part 
time, online, and executive programs. Individual work experience was not recorded, but 
the programs averaged between 4.9 – 15.4 years of work experience. Participant age, 
gender, coursework, and type of MBA program do not influence any statistical results, 
                                                 
1
 Some participants were offered class participation credit, in addition to the $10. The results are robust to 
controlling for compensation type. 
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nor are they individually statistically significant. See Table 1 for participant profile 
information. 
Procedure 
 
The full procedure is outlined in Figure 2. Participants (hereafter, “managers”) 
assume the role of a division manager tasked with reviewing a proposed inventory write 
down and deciding on the final amount. In the control condition, managers are not 
fulfilling the review role, instead, they are asked to make an estimate based on the facts 
of the case, which are consistent across all experimental conditions. The case includes 
information to support both a lower (aggressive) and higher (conservative) write down 
estimate. Managers receive a probable range for the estimate ($100,000 - $500,000). The 
case mentions that the write down will most likely cause the division to miss its profit 
target, but that it is possible to book a smaller write down ($100,000 - $150,000) and 
meet the target.  
The inventory accounting standard requires the write down to be the difference 
between the original cost of inventory and the net realizable value, which is the estimated 
selling price less any “reasonably predictable” costs of completion (ASC 330). The case 
involves damaged inventory that is handcrafted and made mostly of re-workable raw 
materials (metal and glass). This creates uncertainty regarding the estimation of selling 
and completion costs, and does not allow for an easily identifiable “most likely” 
outcome.  
The case provides managers with incentives to manage earnings. These incentives 
create a management preference for lower (more aggressive) estimates in order to meet 
the profit target. Managers are informed that failure to achieve the profit target will result 
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in the loss of a personal bonus, as well as employee bonuses, and increased pressure and 
threats from management regarding job termination. Similar to Brown (2014), there are 
no real economic incentives in my experiment; experimental compensation is not tied to 
the amount of the write down. This design choice biases against finding my predicted 
results because the managers lack the extrinsic motivation found in the workplace. 
However, MBA students are taught the value of maximizing company performance, and 
are likely to understand the desirability of the goal and to incorporate that into their 
judgment process. 
After reading the scenario, all managers (except those in the control group) are 
then provided a point estimate (within the probable range) from a subordinate. They 
review the estimate and make a final decision on the amount of the estimate. Following 
the main experimental materials I measure manager narcissism via the short from of the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory, or NPI-16 (Ames, Rose, and Anderson 2006).
2
 
Finally, managers complete debriefing questions including questions about how they 
made their decisions, their impressions of the subordinate and demographic data. 
Independent Variables 
 
The estimate provided by the subordinate is manipulated to be either consistent 
with management’s reporting incentives (a low estimate of $125,000 - allowing the 
division to exceed the profit target), or inconsistent (a high estimate of $475,000 - 
causing the division to fall short of the profit target). The narcissistic description of the 
subordinate is also manipulated. In the high narcissism condition the subordinate is 
                                                 
2
 Prior accounting literature has found an association between measures of top level manager narcissism 
and earnings management behaviors (Buchholz et al. 2014; Olsen et al. 2014; Ham et al. 2015). My results 
are statistically robust when controlling for manager narcissism.  
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described as charming but vain, and manipulative, while in the low narcissism condition 
the subordinate is described as modest, personable, and transparent. Knowledge and 
ability are held constant. The control group receives no description of the subordinate and 
no subordinate estimate. See the Appendix for a full description of the manipulations.  
 Dependent Variables 
 
Managers record the amount they would approve for the inventory write down. 
They are given a scale with endpoints encompassing the previously defined plausible 
range of the estimate ($100,000 – $500,000). A slider is set to the current subordinate 
estimate ($125,000/$475,000), and the manager is free to move the slider to any position 
on the scale, or accept the subordinate provided estimate.
3
 A lower amount is indicative 
of more aggressive financial reporting. To measure anchoring I first examine managers’ 
final estimates across the experimental conditions. If managers are anchoring on 
subordinate estimates, I expect manager estimates in the incentive consistent (low 
anchor) conditions to be lower than the control condition and manager estimates in the 
incentive inconsistent conditions (high anchor) to be higher than the control condition. To 
measure the amount of anchoring, I examine the divergence of the manager estimates 
from the subordinate estimates. I measure the divergence by taking the absolute value of 
the difference between the initial subordinate estimate and the final manager estimate.
4
 
Smaller divergence indicates greater anchoring on the subordinate estimate.   
  
                                                 
3
 In the control group, the slider is set to the midpoint ($300,000). 
 
4
 Results and statistical inferences are unchanged if the signed divergence is used. On average, final 
estimates in the incentive consistent (inconsistent) condition are higher (lower) than the respective 
subordinate estimate.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
Comprehension and Manipulation Checks 
 
A comprehension check was included to assess managers’ understanding of the 
task and the effect of the write down on profitability. The question asked participants 
(true or false) if increasing the write down would decrease current year income; 81.5% of 
all participants answered the comprehension check correctly.
5
  
A manipulation check asked managers to identify the amount of the subordinate’s 
estimate for the write down. Ninety-six percent of managers identified the correct amount 
for their condition.
6
 To evaluate the effectiveness of the narcissism manipulation, 
managers were asked to rate their agreement with how well each of ten different 
characteristics described the subordinate. The characteristics were identified from 
previous research which associated them with high or low narcissism.
7
 Ratings for each 
characteristic were made on a 7-point Likert scale (endpoints of 1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 
= Strongly Agree). The five low narcissism characteristics were reverse scored and 
averaged with the five high narcissism characteristics to create a single subordinate 
narcissism score.
8
 A higher score indicates managers thought the subordinate was more 
                                                 
5
 The reported results include all participants. However, when excluding those who failed this 
comprehension check the results are statistically robust.  
 
6
 Those in the control condition were not given a subordinate estimate and did not answer this question. 
 
7
 High narcissism traits: aggressive, bossy, self-centered, ambitious, self-confident. Low narcissism traits: 
sensitive, gentle, timid, modest, submissive. (Raskin and Terry 1988; Hart and Adams 2014; Adams et al. 
2015) 
 
8
 Principal components analysis support a single factor solution (eigenvalue = 5.34) accounting for 53% of 
the variance in the ten items. Additionally, Cronbach’s alpha for the items is .901, which indicates high 
reliability.  
 
 19 
 
narcissistic. Those in the high narcissism condition (M = 5.67) thought the subordinate 
was significantly more narcissistic than those in the low narcissism condition (M = 4.04), 
t (145) = -14.41, p < 0.001
9
.  
The results suggest that both manipulations were effective; managers were 
cognizant of the subordinate estimates and they identified the subordinate as 
appropriately more or less narcissistic. I perform a median split on managers’ subordinate 
narcissism scores and classify managers at or below the median as perceiving the 
subordinate to be low in narcissism, and anyone above the median as perceiving the 
subordinate to be high in narcissism. This measure is highly correlated with the actual 
narcissism manipulation, r(147) = 0.796, p < 0.01. All remaining statistical tests are done 
using the median split on subordinate narcissism, but results are statistically similar using 
the original manipulation categorizations.  
Evidence of Management Anchoring 
 
To examine the influence of subordinate estimates I compare managers’ final 
estimates in the experimental conditions to the control group. Table 2, Panel A presents 
the findings: the mean final estimates for the write down made by managers. The mean 
for managers in the control group (M = $259,410) is significantly below the midpoint of 
the plausible range ($300,000), t(36) = -2.842, p = 0.007. This suggests that, on average, 
managers in the control group were slightly aggressive. However, the control group mean 
is also significantly above the estimate required to meet the profit target ($150,000), t(36) 
= 7.659, p < 0.001, implying that most managers acting independently were reluctant to 
report aggressively enough to meet the earnings target.  
                                                 
9
 Reported p-values for all directional tests are one-tailed.  
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Table 2, Panel B reports the results of an analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
planned contrasts are presented in Panel C. These tests show that manager estimates in 
the incentive consistent (low anchor) conditions are lower than the control condition and 
manager estimates in the incentive inconsistent conditions (high anchor) are higher than 
the control condition, all p < 0.012, providing evidence of a general anchoring effect.  
Test of Hypothesis – Effect of Motivated Reasoning on Anchoring 
 
 Table 3, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for manager divergence from the 
subordinate anchor across the experimental conditions. The results are graphically 
depicted in Figure 3. Table 3, Panel B reports the results of an ANOVA, including a 
significant interaction F(1,143) = 2.997, p = .043. H1 predicts that management 
anchoring will diminish (divergence will increase) when subordinate anchors are 
inconsistent with incentives, especially if subordinates exhibit more narcissistic behavior. 
Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) recommend using contrast coding to increase statistical 
power when testing specific “nonsymmetric patterns” of means. To test H1, I run the 
contrast test, reported in Panel C. The contrast tests if the divergence in the incentive 
consistent conditions (A = low narcissism, B = high narcissism) is less than the 
divergence in the incentive inconsistent/low narcissism condition (C), which is, in turn, 
less than the divergence in the incentive inconsistent/high narcissism condition (D). I 
assign contrasts weights of -2, -2, 1, 3, respectively. The contrast is significant, t(143) = 
5.116, p < 0.001. Overall, these results support H1, management anchoring is reduced 
when subordinates provide incentive inconsistent estimates, and to an even greater extent 
when subordinates are described narcissistically.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
 
Evidence of Motivated Reasoning – Moderated Mediation 
 
 Motivated reasoning predicts that in order to adjust away from higher (incentive 
inconsistent) subordinate estimates, managers should selectively attend to information 
that supports a lower estimate or undermines the higher estimate (Ditto and Lopez 1992). 
In this case, managers should selectively attend to subordinate narcissism. To examine 
how subordinate narcissism influences participant perceptions of the subordinate, I ask 
participants the following: “Rate your agreement with the following statement: (the 
subordinate) estimate was influenced by his desire to impress top management”. 
Responses are recorded on a seven point Likert scale (endpoints of 1 – strongly disagree, 
and 7 – strongly agree). A higher score suggests that managers suspected subordinates are 
engaging in strategic and self-interested behavior. An ANOVA test of the managers’ 
responses (untabulated) shows that they perceive narcissistic subordinates as more 
strategic (Mhigh = 5.34, Mlow = 4.61, p = 0.003) and subordinates who provided incentive 
consistent estimates as more strategic (Mconsistent = 5.42, Minconsistent = 4.53, p < 0.001), but 
there is no significant interaction (p = 0.746).  
These results demonstrate that managers have similar opinions of narcissistic 
subordinates, regardless of the consistency of the subordinate estimate with managers’ 
incentives. However, managers may still selectively access these opinions in order to 
justify their anchoring to, or adjustment away from subordinate estimates. To investigate 
this possibility, I test a moderated mediation model. Figure 4 depicts a conceptual model 
(Panel A) and statistical model (Panel B). The model tests if the effect of manager 
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perceptions of strategic subordinate behavior on manager divergence is moderated by the 
consistency of the subordinate estimate with manager incentives.  
I use the Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007) SPSS MODMED macro to test for 
moderated mediation; the results are reported in Table 4. I find that subordinate 
narcissism significantly increases perceptions of strategic subordinate behavior (p = 
0.002), and that these perceptions increase manager divergence (p = 0.014). However, 
this mediation relationship is qualified by a significant mediator/moderator interaction (p 
= 0.058). The effect of manager perceptions of strategic subordinate behavior on manager 
divergence is not significant for incentive consistent estimates (p = 0.716), but the effect 
is significant for incentive inconsistent estimates (p = 0.045). The results are corroborated 
by a bootstrap analysis with 1,000 samples
10
. Overall, the results are consistent with 
motivated reasoning; subordinate narcissism increases perceptions of strategic 
subordinate behavior, but managers appear to selectively attend to their perceptions, 
resulting in decreased anchoring for incentive inconsistent estimates, but not for incentive 
consistent estimates
11
.  
Alternative Anchoring Measure – Distribution of Manager Estimates 
 
Table 5, Panel A presents the percentage of managers that accepted the 
subordinate estimate without adjustment; Panel B presents the percentage of managers 
                                                 
10
 The bootstrap method goes beyond the traditional Baron and Kinney (1986) regression approach, does 
not require data to be normally distributed, and is more suitable for small samples. Using resampling with 
replacement, the macro develops an estimate for the indirect effect and a confidence interval. If the 
confidence interval contains zero, the indirect effect is assumed to be statistically insignificant. 
 
11
 Results are consistent using a two group SEM approach, similar to (Elliott, Hodge, and Sedor 2012). I 
test the mediating effect of perceived exploitive subordinate behavior on the relationship between 
subordinate narcissism and manager divergence separately for managers receiving an incentive consistent 
estimate and managers receiving an incentive inconsistent estimate. I find evidence of partial mediation in 
the incentive inconsistent estimate condition, and no mediation in the incentive consistent condition.  
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that only slightly adjusted the subordinate estimate (made a close estimate). I define an 
estimate as “close” when it is within $25,000 of the subordinate estimate (not including 
participants who accepted the subordinate estimate with no adjustment). I chose this 
threshold because in the incentive consistent conditions any adjustment of $25,000 or less 
would still allow the manager to meet the earnings target. Managers in the incentive 
consistent conditions are no more likely to accept the subordinate estimate (n = 73, 34% 
accept) than managers in the incentive inconsistent conditions (n = 74, 32% accept), χ2 (1, 
147) = 0.054, p = 0.862 (untabulated). However, managers in the incentive consistent 
conditions are more likely to make close adjustments (32% close) than managers in the 
incentive inconsistent conditions (8% close), χ2 (1, 147) = 12.705, p < 0.001 
(untabulated).  
As an alternative test of management anchoring, I create an indicator variable 
(NEAR) equal to 1 if either ACCEPT or CLOSE equals 1 (as long as the manager estimate 
is within $25,000 of the subordinate estimate, including managers who made no 
adjustment), and 0 otherwise. The results are consistent with the main findings. Table 6, 
Panel B reports a logistic regression for the likelihood of making a near estimate. 
Examining the significant interaction of subordinate narcissism and estimate 
aggressiveness (β = 1.466, p = .04) reveals that manager estimates are equally likely to be 
near incentive consistent estimates from high narcissism subordinates (n = 39, 66.7% 
near) and low narcissism subordinates (n = 34, 64.7% near), χ2 (1, 73) = 0.031, p = 0.86 
(untabulated). However, manager estimates are much more likely to be near incentive 
inconsistent estimates from low narcissism subordinates (n = 40, 55% near) than from 
high narcissism subordinates (n = 34, 23.5% near), χ2 (1, 74) = 7.551, p = 0.006 
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(untabulated). These findings corroborate my main findings. Managers anchor on 
subordinate estimates that help them achieve their incentives, regardless of subordinate 
narcissism. However, when subordinate estimates are incentive inconsistent, subordinate 
narcissism reduces manager anchoring.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I use an experiment to examine anchoring effects when managers review 
accounting estimates, and to test how reporting incentives affect managers’ anchoring on 
subordinates’ conclusions. I find evidence of a general anchoring effect. When 
subordinates provide lower (higher) estimates, managers’ final estimates are lower 
(higher) than when managers independently develop their own estimates. However, I also 
find that the degree of anchoring is influenced by how consistent subordinates’ estimates 
are with managers’ reporting incentives. Managers anchor less on subordinate estimates 
that are inconsistent with reporting incentives. My results suggest that managers engage 
in motivated reasoning in order to justify adjusting away from incentive inconsistent 
anchors, or adhering to incentive consistent anchors. I find evidence that motivated 
reasoning causes managers to selectively attend to the personality of the subordinate. 
Specifically, that while managers generally believe narcissistic subordinates act 
strategically in their own interests, this belief only reduces anchoring on incentive 
inconsistent subordinate estimates.  
 My results speak to PCAOB Board Member comments regarding the failure of all 
parties involved in internal controls to “get it right” (Franzel 2014). It is apparent that 
reporting incentives impair the objectivity of managers during the review process by 
causing biased evaluation of the facts and circumstance. My experiment shows that 
managers appear willing to accept incentive consistent estimates with less scrutiny, and 
actively search for ways to dismiss incentive inconsistent estimates. This behavior should 
not be left to the auditors to rectify. In fact, research shows that accounting estimates are 
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among the most difficult items to audit effectively (e.g., Petroni and Beasley 1994; 
Martin, Rich, and Wilks 2006; Christensen, Glover, and Wood 2012). Future research 
can examine features of the process for preparing an estimate (e.g., how information is 
accumulated), as well as features of the review process itself (e.g., emphasizing the 
reasonableness of underlying assumptions, not just the resulting estimate) that may 
reduce manager anchoring and/or motivated reasoning. 
 My study is also informative to both the accounting and management literatures, 
as it highlights the importance of subordinates in the development of accounting 
information. The development of accounting information is a bottom-up process, but 
academic research frequently focuses only on how managers influence accounting 
choices. Accounting and management researchers have written widely on how manager 
characteristics and personality influence decisions and the company, but much less on the 
effects of subordinate personality. My study shows that subordinate personality can 
influence manager decision making, especially in collaborative tasks. Subordinate 
characteristics may affect decisions made in other accounting contexts, such as audit 
reviews, performance reviews, and capital budgeting decisions, which I leave to future 
researchers to examine. 
My study also raises an important implication for the narcissism literature. An 
interesting paradox is that narcissists often make effective leaders (Campbell et al. 2011), 
but narcissistic subordinates are perceived as lacking traits of effective leaders like 
interpersonal skills and integrity (Blair et al. 2008). My research suggests that 
subordinate narcissism may not hinder career advancement, as long as subordinates help 
managers achieve their goals.  
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There are several limitations to my study. First, while I believe MBA students are 
adequate proxies for managers, it is possible managers fulfilling the review role do 
acquire some knowledge or experience that alters the way they complete the task. 
However, prior research has shown the anchoring heuristic is robust to experience and 
knowledge in the domain (Furnham and Boo 2011), and that experienced professionals 
engage in motivated reasoning (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). Second, I manipulate a 
single personality trait in the description of the subordinate. In reality, personalities are 
comprised of many traits, and perceptions of others in the workplace are generally based 
off of some form of interpersonal relationship. While my method allows me to isolate and 
examine the specific effects of subordinate narcissism, it does not allow for interpersonal 
interaction, or for other subordinate personality traits to manifest. To the extent that the 
establishment of a working relationship between manager and subordinate, or the 
subordinate’s other qualities, may influence the review process, the generalizability of 
my results is limited. Future research can examine these possibilities using alternate 
methodologies such as pairing participants over a multi-round experiment.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS 
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High Narcissism Subordinate Manipulation 
Casey Jones is your assistant controller, he is an ambitious employee, and has a strong 
desire for promotion. Becoming a CEO someday is constantly on his mind. He firmly 
believes he has the talent and intelligence to succeed. Casey graduated from an exclusive 
private business school, and frequently reminds people of his pedigree and education. He 
is charismatic, talented, good looking; he is always well dressed in expensive, designer 
clothing, and drives an expensive Italian Alpha Romeo sports roadster. Most people 
would likely describe him as quite narcissistic. 
  
Casey has worked for the company for five years and has advanced quickly. Some co-
workers seem to be drawn to his charm and confident personality; others are put-off by 
his aggressiveness and self-promotion (taking credit for good outcomes; but blaming 
others for bad outcomes). Casey has used his intelligence and a quick wit to get the 
attention of others. He likes to dominate the room. 
  
Casey will do whatever it takes to stand out; he cares very much how he is perceived by 
top management. He thinks that the fastest way to promotion is to show management that 
he can make big things happen. Casey is very confident and optimistic that he can 
achieve anything and everything, and overcome any challenge. 
 
Low Narcissism Subordinate Manipulation 
Casey Jones is your assistant controller; he is a family man and very good at his job. 
Casey is graduated with honors from a highly rated public business school. He is 
attractive and talented, and very personable. Everyone likes him; he is not self-acclaiming 
but rather generously recognizes and gives credit to others for their contributions. He is 
always sharply but conservatively dressed, and drives a late model Cadillac. 
  
Casey has worked for the company for five years, and has excelled at every level. Co-
workers seem to be drawn to his good nature and genuine personality. Casey is 
transparent, welcoming and conservative in everything he does.  Casey is intelligent, 
exhibits a quick wit and prefers to work as part of a team. 
  
Despite his modesty, Casey’s contributions have begun to stand out. He cares very much 
how he is perceived in the company, especially by top management; but he would prefer 
to err on the down side rather than build false expectations. While he has significant 
career aspirations, he thinks the fastest way to promotion is to show management that he 
is a good leader. 
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Aggressive Subordinate Estimate Manipulation 
Casey has prepared a transaction to book the inventory write down for $125,000. If you 
approve this transaction, your division will exceed its profit target by $25,000. Casey 
notes that while the recovery/rework process is uncertain, the company’s workers are 
highly skilled and he is confident that one way or another he can drive this successful 
outcome.  
 
Conservative Subordinate Estimate Manipulation 
Casey has prepared a transaction to book the inventory write down for $475,000. If you 
approve this transaction, your division will miss its profit target by $325,000. Casey 
notes that while the company’s workers are highly skilled, they can only do so much and 
the rework/recovery process is too uncertain and subject to costly over-runs. 
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TABLE 1 
Participant Demographic Data 
 
Participants 184 
Average Age*  32  
Average Number of Accounting and Finance Courses* 2.7 
Average NPI Score  .39  
Percent Male*± 77% 
 
 
*Not all participants completed the entire set of demographic questions. 24 observations 
for Age, 1 observation for Gender, and 3 observations for Coursework are missing.   
 
±The MBA programs range from 72% - 81% male, thus, the sample is representative of 
the typical gender mix.    
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics, ANOVA, and Planned Contrasts for Manager Final Estimate 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Manager Final Estimate, Mean [Standard Deviation] 
 
  
Subordinate Narcissism 
   
  
Low High 
Row Mean 
(SD) Control 
Subordinate 
Estimate 
Incentive 
Consistent 
$173,620  $185,180  $179,790  $259,410 
[$69,652] [$76,650] [$73,199] [$86,885] 
Incentive 
Inconsistent 
$381,050  $312,710  $349,650  
 
 
[$120,414] [$112,840] [$121,154] 
 
 
Column 
Mean (SD) 
$285,740  $244,580  
   
 
[$144,126] [$114,191] 
    
Panel B: ANOVA Model of Manager Final Estimate  
 
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F-statistics p-value 
Condition 1,149,503 4 287,376 31.351 <0.001 
Error 1,640,786 179 9,166   
 
Panel C: Planned Contrasts of Manager Final Estimate 
 
Contrast Difference p-value 
Control v Low-N/Consistent -85,788 <0.001 
Control v Low-
N/Inconsistent 
121,645 <0.001 
Control v High-
N/Consistent 
-74,226 0.001 
Control v High-
N/Inconsistent 
53,300 0.020 
 
This table reports the results of a test for the anchoring effect, comparing the final 
estimates in the experimental conditions to a control condition. The control condition 
creates an unbalanced design. To test for anticipated differences between the conditions, 
a single independent variable, “Condition”, was created in order to conduct a one-way 
ANOVA test with planned contrasts. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics, ANOVA for Divergence from the Subordinate Estimate 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Divergence, Mean [Standard Deviation] 
 
  
Subordinate Narcissism 
 
  
Low High 
Row Mean 
(SD) 
Subordinate 
Estimate 
Incentive 
Consistent 
$50,009  $62,740  $56,850  
[$68,570] [$74,510] [$71,592] 
Incentive 
Inconsistent 
$93,950  $162,290  $125,350  
 
[$120,414] [$112,840] [$121,154] 
 
Column 
Mean (SD) 
$73,800  $109,111  
 
 
[$101,765] [$106,142] 
  
Panel B:  ANOVA Model of Divergence 
 
Source of Variation SS df MS F-statistics p-value 
Narcissism 59,936 1 59,936 6.340 0.013 
Estimate 187,888 1 187,888 19.876 <0.001 
Narcissism x Estimate 28,330 1 28,330 2.997 0.043
± 
Error 1,351,793 143 9,453  
 
 
Panel C: Planned Contrast Test for H1 
  
     
 
A B C D 
Subordinate Estimate Consistent Consistent Inconsistent Inconsistent 
Subordinate Narcissism Low High Low High 
Contrast 1: 𝐴𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ < 𝐶 < 𝐷 -2 -2 1 3 
     
 
t df p-value 
 Contrast 1 5.116 143 <0.001 
  
± One-tailed test for directional hypothesis. 
 
This table reports the results for the test of H1. Divergence is measured by taking the 
absolute value of the difference between the manager final estimate and the subordinate 
provided estimate. The subordinate estimate is $125,000 ($475,000) in the incentive 
consistent (inconsistent) condition. Lower divergence implies the manager anchored 
more on the estimate of the subordinate. See the Appendix for details on the manipulation 
of subordinate narcissism. 
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TABLE 4 
Test of Moderated Mediation 
 
 
Panel A: Effect of Subordinate Narcissism on Strategic Perception 
 
       Predictor   β SE t p 
 Constant 
 
3.765 0.404 10.484 <0.001 
 Narcissism 
 
-0.802 0.256 -3.134 0.002 
 
       Panel B: Moderated Mediation Model, DV = Divergence 
 
       Predictor   β SE t p 
 Constant 
 
-31.946 82.667 -0.386 0.699 
 Narcissism 
 
34.588 16.396 2.110 0.037 
 Strategic Perception 
 
38.794 15.617 -2.484 0.014 
 Estimate
 
 
27.528 59.284 0.464 0.643 
 Strategic x Estimate -21.174 11.096 1.908 0.058 
 
       Panel C: Conditional Indirect Effect of Strategic Perception 
       Subordinate Estimate Effect SE z p LLCI ULCI 
Incentive Inconsistent 14.137 7.056 2.004 0.045 2.017 33.069 
Incentive Consistent -2.851 7.834 -0.364 0.716 -20.407 7.917 
 
This table presents the results of a test for moderated mediation. Specifically that 1) 
subordinate narcissism increases manager perception of the subordinate’s behavior as 
strategic and 2) the effect of this perception on management divergence (anchoring) is 
moderated by how consistent the subordinate estimate is with manager incentives. See 
Figure 3 for a diagram of the model. Panels A and B present the results of a regression-
based test. Panel C presents the results of a bootstrap analysis with 1,000 samples to test 
the conditional indirect effect.  
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TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistics for ACCEPT, and CLOSE 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for ACCEPT, Percentages [ratio] 
 
  
Subordinate 
Narcissism 
 
  
Low High 
Row 
Total 
Subordinate 
Estimate 
Incentive 
Consistent 
41.2% 28.2% 34.2% 
[14/34] [11/39] [25/73] 
Incentive 
Inconsistent 
45% 17.6% 32.4% 
 
[18/40] [6/34] [24/74] 
 
Column 
Total 
43.2% 23.3% 
 
 
[32/74] [17/73] 
  
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for CLOSE, Percentages [ratio] 
  
  
Subordinate 
Narcissism 
 
  
Low High 
Row 
Total 
Subordinate 
Estimate 
Incentive 
Consistent 
23.5% 38.5% 31.5% 
[8/34] [15/39] [23/73] 
Incentive 
Inconsistent 
10% 5.9% 8.1% 
 
[4/40] [2/34] [6/74] 
 
Column 
Total 
16.2% 23.3% 
 
 
[12/74] [17/73] 
   
This table reports descriptive statistics for ACCEPT, and CLOSE. For each participant 
ACCEPT = 1 if the participant made no adjustment to the initial subordinate estimate, and 
0 otherwise. CLOSE = 1 if the participant adjustment is between $1 and $25,000. $25,000 
was chosen as the threshold for a close estimate because in the aggressive estimate 
condition, any adjustment exceeding that amount would result in failure to meet the 
earnings target.  
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics for NEAR, Logistic Regression for NEAR 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for NEAR, Percentages [ratio] 
 
  
Subordinate 
Narcissism 
 
  
Low High 
Row 
Total 
Subordinate 
Estimate 
Incentive 
Consistent 
64.7% 66.7% 65.8% 
[22/34] [26/39] [48/73] 
Incentive 
Inconsistent 
55% 23.5% 40.5% 
 
[22/40] [8/34] [30/74] 
 
Column 
Total 
59.5% 46.6% 
 
 
[44/74] [34/73] 
  
 
 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression for the Likelihood of Making a NEAR Estimate 
 
Source of Variation β Wald Odds Ratio p-value 
Narcissism -0.087 0.031 0.917 0.860 
Estimate -1.872 12.565 0.154 <0.001 
Narcissism X Estimate 1.466 4.227 4.333 0.040
 
 
Model χ2(3) = 17.285, p < 0.001, Nagelkerke R2 = 0.148 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for NEAR, and a logistic regression for the effects 
of subordinate estimate consistency with management incentives and subordinate 
narcissism on the likelihood of making a NEAR estimate. ACCEPT and CLOSE (Table 5) 
are mutually exclusive, NEAR combines the two into one measure, NEAR = 1 if ACCEPT 
= 1 OR CLOSE =1.  
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FIGURE 1 
Experimental Design and Predictions for H1 
Manager Divergence from Subordinate Estimates 
 
 Subordinate Narcissism 
Low High 
 
 
Subordinate 
Estimate 
Incentive  
Consistent 
 
A – Small divergence 
(more anchoring) 
B – Small divergence 
(more anchoring) 
Incentive 
Inconsistent 
C – Moderate divergence 
 (less anchoring) 
D – Large divergence 
(less anchoring) 
 
 
 
 
This figure depicts the experimental design and the hypothesized effects of subordinate 
estimate consistency with incentives and subordinate narcissism on management 
anchoring (measured via divergence from the subordinate estimate). Divergence is 
calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the manager’s final estimate 
and the subordinate’s initial estimate. Greater divergence implies less anchoring. 
  
H1: 𝑨𝑩̅̅ ̅̅ <  𝑪 < 𝑫 
  
A 
C 
B 
D 
Consistent Inconsistent
Subordinate Estimate 
Manager Divergence 
Low High
Subordinate 
 Narcissism 
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FIGURE 2 
Experimental Procedure 
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FIGURE 3 
Experimental Results 
Manager Divergence from (anchoring on) Subordinate Estimates 
 
 
 
This figured depicts the observed effect of subordinate estimate consistency with 
manager incentives and subordinate narcissism on management divergence from 
(anchoring on) the subordinate estimate. Lower divergence implies greater anchoring. 
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FIGURE 4 
Moderated Mediation Model 
 
 
 
